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Recent turmoil in financial markets has substantially reduced the retirement sav-
ings of many workers and retirees alike. This has heightened public concerns that 
many older American households will not accumulate sufficient retirement sav-
ings to meet their needs in retirement. Fortunately, about half of older American 
households count on income from a defined benefit (DB) pension. 
This “pension factor” has helped substantial numbers of older 
American households avoid material hardships associated with 
inadequate food, shelter, and health care and to avoid having to 
rely on public assistance. More specifically, we estimate that in 
2006, DB pension receipt among older American households 
was associated with:
1.72 million fewer poor households and 2.97 million fewer v 
near-poor households
560,000 fewer households experiencing a food hardshipv 
380,000 fewer households experiencing a shelter hardshipv 
320,000 fewer households experiencing a health care v 
hardship
1.35 million fewer households receiving means-tested v 
public assistance
We calculated a savings of some $7.3 billion in public assistance 
expenditures in 2006, not counting Medicaid reimbursements 
for acute and long-term medical care, which can be attributed 
to receipt of DB pension income. Our estimates of savings 
represent about 8.5 percent of aggregate public assistance 
dollars received by all American households in 2006 for the 
same benefit programs. This amount is significant, particularly 
given the pressures on safety net programs during the current 
fiscal crises experienced at all levels of government throughout 
the country.
The predictable monthly benefits provided by DB plans remain 
a source of security to these retired households, enabling 
millions of Americans to remain secure and independent in 
old age. This study analyzes the contribution of DB pensions 
to the economic security of older American households. 
Our findings indicate that DB pension income plays a vital role in 
reducing the risk of poverty and material hardships among older 
Americans. Rates of poverty among older households without 
DB pension income were approximately six times greater than 
the rate among older households with DB pension income. 
Older households with DB pension income also were far less 
likely to experience food, shelter, and health care hardships. In 
addition, DB pension recipient households were less reliant on 
means-tested cash and non-cash public assistance. 
While households with DB pension income generally fared 
better than households without pension income, DB pensions 
appear to have particularly improved the economic security 
of more vulnerable subpopulations of elder households. Our 
analysis suggests that common gender and racial disparities in 
rates of poverty, material hardships, and dependence on public 
assistance are greatly diminished, and in some cases nearly 
eliminated, among households receiving DB pension income. 
Even after controlling for a range of socio-demographic factors 
such as education, race, gender, and work history, we find that 
households with a pension fare better than those without. In 
other words, DB pensions appear to exert an independent, 
positive effect on older Americans’ economic well-being – an 
effect we call the “pension factor.”
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Traditional defined benefit (DB) pension plans have long been an important source 
of income for elder households seeking to maintain a middle-class standard of 
living after a lifetime of work. Under traditional DB plans, retirees receive a guar-
anteed, regular stream of income after retirement that continues until death. 
at age 65, or income that is sufficient for roughly maintaining 
one’s pre-retirement standard of living.3 Other experts have 
shown that DB pensions are a major income component 
for both middle and upper income retirees.4 Whereas DB 
pension income comprised only about 3 percent of total 
household income among the poorest elderly households in 
the bottom quartile of the household income distribution in 
2007, it comprised about 21 percent and 15 percent of income 
among households in the top two household income quartiles, 
respectively.5 
A review of the evidence in studies such as those noted here 
finds a compelling case for the vital role that DB pensions 
play in ensuring economic self-sufficiency of retired American 
households.6 Several distinctive features of DB pensions 
should be noted as contributing factors. First, eligible 
employees are automatically included in DB plans and do 
not face decisions about whether to participate, how much to 
save, and how to invest the savings. Second, DB plans better 
protect retirement wealth from pre-retirement “leakages” 
due to borrowing or pre-retirement withdrawals. Third, DB 
pension recipients can’t outlive their retirement benefits, and a 
spouse’s access to this pension income is protected after one’s 
own death. Because of these unique features of DB pension 
plans, older American households with pension income 
should have greater economic security than their counterparts 
without such income. However, this proposition has not been 
examined empirically in past research. 
In this report we undertake an empirical examination of 
the contribution of DB pension income in enhancing the 
economic welfare of older American households. We use data 
from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Survey of Income Program 
Participation (SIPP) to examine who receives pension income, 
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The monthly pension benefit is typically based on years 
of service to the employer, age, and salary history. Retirees 
also have the option to elect a joint-and-survivor benefit, to 
ensure that pension payments continue to a surviving spouse. 
DB plan participation rates among private sector American 
workers have sharply decreased from about 38 in 1980 to 20 
percent in 2008.1 DB plan coverage in the public sector has 
not followed this same trend. Overwhelmingly, employees of 
local, state or federal government are covered by a traditional 
pension plan. For the same time period, the percentage of 
private sector workers covered by a defined contribution 
(DC) retirement plan, such as 401(k) plans, rose from 8 to 31 
percent. Under such DC plans, employers and/or employees 
make contributions to a retirement savings account. Employees 
typically need to decide how to invest these sums in order to 
produce accumulated savings for income at retirement. 
Recent turmoil in financial markets has substantially reduced 
the DC plan retirement savings of many workers and retirees 
alike. This has heightened public concerns that many 
older American households will not accumulate sufficient 
retirement savings to meet their needs in retirement. Although 
investment losses certainly have adversely affected the funding 
of many DB plans, the predictable monthly benefits of DB 
plans remain a source of security to retired households who 
have these plans.2 
Evidence of the contributions of DB pensions to the retirement 
readiness of households has been noted long before the 
current crises in financial markets. For example, projections by 
Munnell, Webb, and Golub-Sass show that households with 
heads born after 1945 with a DB plan are about twice as likely 
than their counterparts with only a DC plan or no retirement 
plan at all, to have adequate replacement retirement income 
CWT?T]bX^]5PRc^a)0bbTbbX]VcWTA^[T^U3TË]TS1T]TËc?[P]bX]ATSdRX]V4[STa7PaSbWX_b"
_T]bX^]baT\PX]P]X\_^acP]cb^daRT
^UX]R^\TU^a\XSS[TR[PbbaTcXaTTb
how much, and how this has changed over time. We then assess 
the extent to which DB pension income has protected older 
American households from poverty in general, and also from 
experiencing various food, shelter, and health care hardships. 
We provide descriptive statistics for the older population as a 
whole, as well as for distinct demographic groups. Lastly, and 
perhaps most importantly, we derive estimates of the effect of 
DB pension receipt in reducing older households’ reliance on 
public assistance, and the associated savings to governments in 
public assistance expenditures. 
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The study data were drawn from 1996, 2001, and 2004 panels 
of the SIPP.7 Each SIPP panel is a representative national 
sample of the civilian population not living in institutions. 
SIPP Panel members are interviewed at four-month time 
intervals over 3-4 year time spans, so the 2004 SIPP panel, 
for example, incorporates data from 2004 through 2006. A 
core set of income, labor force, and program participation 
questions are asked at each interview. Additional questions 
on a variety of topics such as pension plan coverage, adult 
well-being, employment history, or health are also asked at 
specific interviews in the form of topical modules. Topical 
module questions are asked in only one of the 9-12 interviews 
conducted during the multi-year span of the panel survey. For 
this study, core interview variables were used from questions 
asked in the same month of the Retirement and Pension 
Plan Coverage topical module. Material hardship variables 
were obtained from the Adult Well-Being topical module 
conducted in a different month. The study sample included 
all SIPP respondents age 60 years or older and all households 
with a head age 60 and older, respectively, who had records in 
both the Pension and Adult Well-Being topical modules.8
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics about persons who have received DB pen-
sion income, how much they received, and how this has changed over time from 
SIPP data. Receipt of a DB pension is defined here as receiving regular pension 
income from a former employer for reasons of retirement, disability, or survivor-
ship that are expected to last for the remainder of one’s life. 
Similar to past research using SIPP data,9 lump sum pension 
distributions are not counted as DB pension income. 
According to these data, about 31.5 percent of persons age 60 
or older in the U.S. received DB pension income from a former 
employer of their own in 2006. The mean and median annual 
pension amounts received in 2006 were about $15,784 and 
$11,467, respectively.10 While appropriate for many purposes, 
this definition of pension receipt does not include survivors 
who receive DB pension income from a job held by a former 
decedent spouse, or persons who benefit from the DB pension 
income of their current spouse. When these sources of DB 
pension income are also counted, the 2006 estimated rate of 
DB pension receipt increases to 48.2 percent of persons age 
60 or older, with mean and median annual pension amounts 
per recipient of $18,195 and $12,480, respectively. The 
higher mean and median pension amounts under this broader 
definition of DB pension receipt are the result of counting 
both pension incomes of dual-recipient married couples.11
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Although there have been dramatic declines in DB pension 
plan participation among private sector workers since the early 
1980s,12 the data in Table 1 suggest that these declines in plan 
participation have not yet produced sharp declines in rates of 
actual DB pension income receipt among older Americans. A 
fairly modest decline is observed in the percentage of persons 
aged 60 or older receiving DB pension income between 1998 
and 2006. The similar estimated rates of DB pension receipt in 
1998 and 2003 are only about 2 to 3 percentage points higher 
than the 2006 estimates, regardless of how broadly pension 
receipt is defined. In all three years prevalence rates of DB 
pension income receipt are about 16 to 18 percentage points 
higher when spousal sources of pension income are considered 
relative to when they are not. Since many workers affected 
by the shift toward DC plans over the last two decades may 
have not yet retired from the labor force, future data may show 
more marked declines in DB pension receipt than is apparent 
in 2006 data.
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Table 2 shows how rates of DB pension income receipt varied 
with selected characteristics of older Americans in 2006.13 
Older men are nearly twice as likely as women to report DB 
pension income from a former employer (42.0 percent vs 23.3 
percent) and the amounts received are substantially larger 
as well. The mean annual pension from a former employer 
among older men of $18,040 is more than 40 percent greater 
than the mean of $12,589 among women. These gender 
differences reflect the historical lower rates of labor force 
participation and earnings of women relative to men for this 
older population cohort.14 When spousal sources of pension 
income are counted in the broader definition of DB pension 
receipt, the gender disparity in pension amounts received are 
substantially reduced and the gender disparity in DB pension 
receipt is nearly eliminated (49.8 percent vs 46.9 percent). A 
little more than 60 percent of the marginal increase in the 
rate of DB pension receipt among women under the broader 
definition stems from being a current spouse of a current DB 
pension recipient, with the rest attributable to counting DB 
pension survivor benefits.
Table 2 also indicates there are notable racial/ethnic disparities 
in DB pension income receipt among older Americans. 
However, the pattern of changes in race/ethnic disparities 
under the alternative definitions of DB pension receipt differ 
from those found for gender. When DB pension receipt is based 
only on pension income from one’s own former employer, rates 
of DB pension receipt among older non-Hispanic White and 
Blacks were similar (32.7 percent vs 32.0 percent) and were 
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much higher than for persons of other race/ethnicity (22.6 
percent). When spousal sources of DB pension income are 
counted, a White-Black racial disparity in DB pension receipt 
emerges (50.7 percent vs 42.8 percent). However, the mean 
and median income received by White pension recipients 
exceeded that pension recipients of all other race/ethnic groups 
regardless of whether spousal pension income is counted or 
not. These data suggest that there may be disproportionately 
more married persons and persons with DB survivor benefits 
among older Whites relative to Blacks. 
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When the data are displayed by household income quintiles in 
Table 2, they show the expected results that older persons with 
lowest household incomes are least likely to have DB pension 
income and, on average, receive the smallest pension amounts. 
Similar to other researchers,15 SIPP data suggest that DB 
pension income is a particularly important income component 
for middle-class older Americans. Whereas mean and median 
pension amounts received increase monotonically from the 
lowest to the highest household income quartiles, rates of DB 
pension income receipt are highest among older persons in 
the third and fourth quintiles of the national distribution of 
annual household income.
Table 2 also contains data on the geographic variations in 
rates of DB pension receipt and pension amounts. Although 
regional disparities are generally modest, lower rates of DB 
pension receipt are found among older persons living in the 
South relative to other regions, and recipients living in the West 
receive larger pensions relative to other regions. These regional 
disparities are not surprising given the history of lower rates of 
unionization in the South and the higher living costs and wages 
of workers in the West region of the United States.16 
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Finally, Table 2 shows the number of older persons with private 
and public DB pension income and the amounts received. Public 
pensions include civilian and military federal government, 
state government, local government, and Railroad Retirement 
Board pensions. Private pensions include company, union, 
and other nongovernment retirement pensions. Regardless of 
how pension receipt is defined, private DB pension recipients 
greatly outnumbered public DB pension recipients in 2006. 
Almost 71 percent of DB pension recipients in 2006 received 
some private pension income, either alone (63.7 percent), or 
with public pension income (7 percent). A little more than 36 
percent of DB pension recipients received some public pension 
income, either alone (29.2 percent), or with private pension 
income (7 percent). When spousal sources of pension income 
are also considered, the percentage of the much larger pool 
of pension recipients with some public DB pension income 
remains about 36 percent, while the percentage of pension 
recipients with some private DB pension income increases to 
74.5 percent. 
While far fewer in number, public DB pension recipients 
generally received far greater annual pension income than 
their private DB pension recipient counterparts. The mean 
and median annual amounts of pension income of $21,916 
and $18,563 among recipients with only public pensions were 
roughly 2 and 2.4 times greater than the mean ($11,183) and 
median ($7,782) amounts received by DB pension recipients 
with only private pensions in 2006.17 The relatively small pool 
of DB pension recipients with both private and public pensions 
received much larger pension incomes than their counterparts 
with only public or private pension income even when pension 
receipt is based solely upon one’s own former employment. 
When spousal sources of pension income are also considered, 
there is a modest increase in the disparity between private 
and public pension amounts received by recipients. Similar 
disparities in the size of public and private DB pensions 
have also been documented by others.18 The greater income 
received by public relative to private DB pension recipients 
reflects the fact that nearly all state and local government 
employees contribute to their pensions, while employees in 
the private sectors do not.19 Also, because many state and 
local employees are not covered by Social Security, these 
DB pensions compensate for that lack of coverage. Other 
factors that also play a role are lower job turnover and longer 
employment tenure among government employees, as well as 
their occupational mix and higher education levels.20
?T]bX^]8]R^\T2^\_PaTSc^>cWTa
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Some perspective on the magnitudes of both the rates of 
DB pension receipt and amounts received by older persons 
can be found in Table 3. This table presents comparative data 
on estimated receipt rates and the mean and median annual 
amounts of DC and Social Security income received by older 
Americans in 2006. These data show that DC income receipt 
rates were much lower than the receipt rates of both DB 
and Social Security income, and the rate of Social Security 
income receipt was highest among the three sources of 
retirement income. While the mean annual income received 
was greatest for DC income recipients and lowest for Social 
Security income recipients, these rankings are reversed when 
median amounts received are considered.21 The median annual 
amount of Social Security income among recipients exceeded 
that for both DB and DC income recipients. For both DB 
and DC income, the mean amounts received are much larger 
than their median amounts. This differential suggests that the 
distributions of amounts received by DB and DC recipients are 
more heavily skewed than for Social Security recipients. This 
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typically results when a relatively small fraction of individuals 
is receiving very large annual amounts relative to others. 
We now turn to the economic welfare of older American households with DB pen-
sion income relative to other households. Income offers a means for households to 
consume goods and services that are necessary to meet their basic needs. Therefore, 
income is widely accepted as an important indicator of economic well-being. 
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Comparing household incomes to thresholds, such as federal 
poverty levels, is a common way to assess the economic welfare 
of various subpopulations and changes in their economic 
welfare over time. For example, although poverty among 
older Americans remains an important policy concern, the 
percentage of older Americans living in poverty has declined 
markedly since the 1960’s largely because of the growth in 
Social Security coverage and benefits.22 
Conventional poverty-level measures have a number of 
acknowledged limitations such as the exclusion of noncash 
benefits (e.g., food stamps, housing subsidies) and earned 
income tax benefits. The measures also do not incorporate 
adjustments for expenditures that are not directly made for the 
consumption of necessities, such as childcare, taxes, various 
work-related expenses, as well as for geographic cost-of-
living differentials.23 Aside from these technical limitations, 
they measure resources available for consumption rather than 
consumption itself. Direct measures of material hardships 
have been developed from reported consumption patterns 
and physical living conditions judged to be inadequate by 
societal standards. Despite some shortcomings of their own,24 
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material hardship measures provide a tangible picture of 
the actual consequences of inadequate economic resources 
for households. They are generally regarded as useful 
supplements to conventional income-poverty indicators for 
assessing economic well-being.25 In Tables 4 through 6 below, 
we compare not only poverty rates, but also rates of selected 
material hardships among households with and without DB 
pension income.
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Table 4 shows how poverty rates varied among older households 
with DB pension receipt status and selected characteristics 
of the householder. Since federal poverty thresholds of the 
U.S. Bureau of the Census are measured for families, we 
analyzed the family income received by SIPP households with 
a householder age 60 or older rather than income received 
individually by all older persons. Households with incomes 
below the federal poverty line (FPL) are classified as “poor.” 
Households with incomes exceeding the FPL but less than or 
equal to 200 percent of the FPL are classified as “near-poor,” 
while households with incomes exceeding 200 percent of the 
FPL are classified as “not-poor.” DB pension receipt pertains 
to both the householder and his/her spouse. 
In 2006 about 9 percent of American households with 
householders aged 60 or older were poor, and another 25.5 
percent of them were near-poor. The poverty rate is much 
lower among older households with DB pension income 
relative to their counterparts with no DB pension income. 
This is not surprising because lower income workers are the 
least likely to be covered by a pension.26 The poverty rate of 
15.1 percent among older households without any DB pension 
income exceeded the 2.4 percent rate of households with DB 
pension income by more than a factor of six. In addition, the 
33.9 percent rate of near-poverty among households without 
DB pension income is more than double the near-poverty 
rate of 15.1 percent found for those with DB pension income. 
While still much lower than households with no DB pension 
income, poverty rates were much higher among households 
with only private DB pension income relative to those with 
only public DB pension income and those with both public 
and private pension income. These results are consistent with 
the larger pension amounts of public relative to private DB 
income recipients reported earlier in Table 2.
We find the expected large gender and racial disparities in 
poverty rates among older American households. But, the 
data also suggest that DB pensions can reduce gender and 
racial gaps. As shown in Table 4, older households headed 
by women generally exhibit higher poverty rates than those 
headed by men with the same DB pension status. However, 
female-headed households with DB pension income exhibit 
lower poverty rates than male-headed households without 
DB pension income. More importantly, the 4.3 percentage 
point female disparity in the percentage of poor households 
without DB pension income (16.8 percent vs 12.5 percent) 
is nearly eliminated among households with DB pension 
income (i.e., 2.5 percent vs 2.2 percent). Similar changes in 
racial disparities in poverty rates are found when DB pension 
receipt is distinguished. Poverty rates are generally much 
higher among non-White households relative to their White 
counterparts. However, the double-digit percentage point 
White-non-White racial disparity in poverty rates among 
households without DB pension income (11.5 percent for 
Whites vs 29.4 percent for Blacks and 24.6 percent for Other 
Race) is reduced to a disparity of less than 4 percentage points 
among households with DB pension income (1.9 percent for 
Whites vs 5.2 percent for Blacks and 4.7 percent for Other 
Race). These data suggest that DB pensions have helped many 
older non-white and female-headed households to escape 
poverty as defined by the FPL. 
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We analyzed three types of material hardships: inadequate 
food consumption, inability to meet basic expenses associated 
with shelter, and unmet medical or dental needs. Our selection 
of these hardship measures was guided by the findings of 
past research employing SIPP data on material hardships.27 
We discuss our empirical findings for each of these material 
hardship measures in turn.
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Table 5 shows rates of food hardships among older American 
households in 2006. Hardships associated with inadequate 
food consumption were based on a food security scale based 
on the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) employed in 
previous research by She & Livermore.28 The scale is derived 
from responses to five questions about food-related hardships 
experienced due to lack of money over the last four months: (1) 
food we bought didn’t last, (2) couldn’t afford balanced meals, 
(3) cut size or skipped meals, (4) ate less than felt needed, 
and (5) didn’t eat for a whole day. Households with two or 
more responses of “yes," “often,” or “sometimes” are classified 
as experiencing a food insecurity hardship.29 While the data in 
Table 5 suggest that overall relatively few older American 
households experienced food hardships (4.7 percent), there are 
disparities in rates of food hardships among subpopulations 
of households distinguished by DB pension receipt. The 
rate of food hardships among older households without DB 
pension income (6.7 percent) is more than double that of their 
counterparts with DB pension income (2.6 percent). 
Gender and race disparities in rates of food hardships are 
apparent in Table 5, but the data also show substantial 
reductions in these disparities among households receiving 
DB pension income. For example, the 1.5 percentage point 
gender disparity in the rate of food hardship (7.2 percent vs 
5.7 percent) among households without DB pension income 
is more than halved (2.9 percent vs 2.3 percent) among 
households with DB pension income. The 8.6 percentage 
point Black-White racial disparity in the rate of food hardship 
(13.4 percent vs 4.8 percent) among households without DB 
pension income is nearly halved to 4.5 percentage points (6.4 
percent vs 1.9 percent) among households with DB pension 
income. Lastly, while Table 5 expectedly shows much higher 
risks of food hardships among poorest households, within 
each income quartile rates of food hardships are considerably 
lower among households with DB pension income relative to 
those without such income. 
Table 5 also displays rates of shelter expense and health care 
hardships in 2006. Households reporting that they were 
unable to pay the full amount of the rent or mortgage, or the 
full amount of gas, oil, electricity, or telephone utility bills, 
are classified as having experienced a shelter expense hardship. 
Although the vast majority of Americans 65 years and older 
are entitled under Medicare, most dental services and some 
medical expenses are not covered by Medicare and out-of-
pocket costs for deductibles and co-payments can impose 
a strain on household budgets. Households are defined as 
having experienced a health care hardship if they reported that 
in the past year one or more household members did not see a 
doctor or dentist when there was a need to see one. These data 
show that about 4.6 percent of older American households 
were unable to fully meet their regular expenses for shelter in 
2006. In about 6 percent of households at least one member 
had to forgo a needed doctor or dental visit during the year. 
Rates of shelter and medical hardships were much lower 
among households with DB pension income relative to their 
counterparts without such income. Whereas only 2.4 percent 
of households with DB pension income experienced a shelter 
expense hardship in 2006, about 6.6 percent of households 
without DB pension income experienced such a hardship. 
Rates of shelter expense hardships were particularly low among 
households receiving public DB pension alone (1.7 percent) 
or both public and private DB pension income (1.6 percent). 
Similar to food hardships, there are fairly large gender and 
race disparities in rates of shelter and health care hardships 
that are attenuated within the subpopulation of households 
receiving DB pension income. The reduction of these gender 
and race disparities suggests that DB pension income has 
disproportionately helped older non-white and female-headed 
households to avoid these forms of material hardships.
7^dbTW^[Sb fXcW ?T]bX^] 8]R^\T ;Tbb
;XZT[hc^AT[h^]?dQ[XR0bbXbcP]RT
For many older American households with insufficient 
retirement income, particularly those unable to work or to 
find suitable employment, there may be few options other 
that to seek public assistance to help them meet their basic 
living needs. Table 6 shows that 10.9 percent of some 31.6 
million American households with a head age 60 or older 
received an average of $5,373 per household in means-tested 
cash transfers (e.g., Supplemental Security Income (SSI), 
general assistance) and/or noncash public assistance (e.g., 
food stamps, rent subsidies, energy assistance) in 2006. This 
is a conservative estimate of public assistance receipt since the 
SIPP definition of means-tested public assistance does not 
include expenditures made on behalf of Medicaid recipients. 
The data in Table 6 suggest that households receiving DB 
pension income are much less reliant on public assistance 
transfers than households without pension income. Among 
households without DB pension income, 16.6 percent 
received public assistance in 2006. That was more than triple 
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the 4.6 percent rate for households with DB pension income. 
Furthermore, in 2006 public assistance recipients with DB 
pension received about $1,020 less, on average, in cash and 
noncash transfer income than their public assistance recipient 
counterparts without DB pension income.
Table 6 also shows large gender and racial disparities in rates 
of public assistance receipt. Among households without DB 
pension income, non-White households are more than three 
times as likely to receive public assistance, as compared with 
White households (36-37 percent vs. 10.6 percent). The rate 
of public assistance receipt is a little higher among households 
without DB pension income headed by women (18.3 percent) 
relative to men (14 percent). But among households with DB 
pension income, there is no gender disparity. Although a racial 
disparity remains in relative rates of public assistance among 
households with DB pension income, absolute differences 
between rates of public assistance receipt between nonwhite 
and white households (10-12 percent vs 3.4 percent) are 
greatly reduced. These latter results are consistent with the 
empirical literature on racial differences in participation rates 
in food stamp and federal welfare programs among households 
of all ages. Some racial disparities in participation rates 
generally persist after adjustments are made for need factors 
affecting welfare participation.30 The reasons for these racial 
disparities are not fully understood. They have been attributed 
to lower take up rates among eligible whites due to factors 
such as inadequate information about programs and eligibility 
requirements, perceived high costs of participation and lack of 
need, as well as stigma against use of public assistance.31
The descriptive statistics presented suggest that older households with DB pension 
income fare much better than households without such income on several indica-
tors of economic welfare. 
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Relative to households without DB pension income, households 
with DB pension income are less likely to be classified as 
poor or near-poor (Table 4), less likely to experience material 
hardships associated with food consumption, shelter expenses, 
and foregone medical and dental care (Table 5), and are less 
likely to rely on means-tested public assistance (Table 6). We 
now will attempt to quantify these impacts by developing 
estimates of how many households were able to escape poverty 
and avoid material hardships as a consequence of their DB 
pension income. In addition we estimate government savings 
in the form of reduced public assistance expenditures associated 
with DB pension income receipt by older households. In 
order to provide some perspective on the magnitude of these 
estimated impacts of DB pension income receipt, we develop 
similar estimates of the impacts of DC and Social Security 
income receipt.
The estimated impacts of DB, DC, and Social Security 
income receipt were computed from predictions derived from 
household-level binary logit or multinomial logit (MNL) 
models for each of the economic welfare outcomes contained 
in Tables 4 through 6 — incidence of poverty, hardships, and 
public assistance receipt. These models enable us to isolate the 
effect of DB pension receipt on the probability of suffering 
an adverse outcome. Each statistical model includes a set 
of “control variables” — household characteristics that, in 
theory, should also affect the probability that a household will 
experience the adverse outcome. For example, consider the 
outcome of a shelter hardship. In order to estimate the effect 
of DB pension receipt on the probability that a household will 
experience a shelter hardship, we must control for differences in 
the education, age, gender, marital status, and race of heads of 
household, because the risk of experiencing a shelter hardship 
will be higher or lower depending on these attributes. For 
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example, a household headed by a better-educated, married, 
white male may be expected to have a more continuous work 
history, higher earnings, and greater wealth accumulation 
than a household headed by a lesser-educated, divorced, Black 
woman. Since the male should also be more likely to have 
worked in a job with a DB pension benefit, such potential 
confounding variables must be specified in statistical model 
of the risk of shelter hardship. Otherwise, we may erroneously 
attribute the effects of factors such as higher education, male 
gender, or race to an effect of DB pension receipt. In each 
statistical model the probability of experiencing an adverse 
outcome was specified to be a function of socio-demographic 
attributes of the household and its head. Depending on the 
specification, these attributes included age, gender, race, 
marital status, education level, household size, foreign 
born, geographic location factors (region and metropolitan 
residence), employment status (hours worked), and indicators 
of whether or not one receives DB pension income, DC 
income, and Social Security income, as well as work history 
and pre-retirement income. 
The estimated coefficients from these statistical models can 
be used to generate predicted probabilities that households 
with different characteristics (like those mentioned above) will 
experience each poverty and material hardship outcome. The 
coefficient for any particular factor specified in the model, such 
as DB pension receipt, reflects the independent contribution 
of that factor to these estimated probabilities after all of the 
other factors are taken account of. For example, consider 
two households that have identical socio-demographic and 
economic attributes and who live in the same geographic 
region. Neither household receives DC income and both 
receive some Social Security income. The households differ 
only in that one of them receives some DB pension income 
and the other does not. The estimated coefficient for the DB 
pension receipt variable in the statistical models allows us to 
estimate how much the probability of each hardship outcome 
will differ for these two, otherwise identical, households. By 
extension, these coefficients can also be used to estimate for 
how much the probability of hardship and poverty outcomes 
are expected to change, on average, for each household with 
DB pension income in the sample data if they had not received 
any DB pension income. 
The estimated coefficients from the statistical models 
were used to generate national predictions of the number 
of households that would have experienced each adverse 
outcome, such as a shelter hardship, if no households received 
any DB pension income. The difference between this adjusted 
estimate and the national estimate of households actually 
experiencing the outcome produces a national estimate of 
the number of households that were able to avoid the adverse 
economic welfare outcome because of their receipt of DB 
pension income. Additional details about the analytic strategy, 
model estimation, and sensitivity analyses conducted to test 
the robustness of the empirical results can be found in the 
Technical Appendix.32
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Table 7 presents national estimates of the impacts of DB 
pension, DC, and Social Security income on the poverty 
status of households with a head age 60 or older in 2006. 
The estimates were derived by employing predicted values 
from a MNL model which predicted the likelihood of a 
household being poor, near-poor, or not-poor, based on its 
socio-demographic characteristics.33 The estimates suggest 
that about 4.7 million older households would be added to the 
count of poor or near-poor households if not for their receipt 
of DB pension income. An estimated 1.6 million additional 
households would be similarly re-classified from their not-poor 
poverty status if not for their receipt of Social Security income. 
About 90,000 not-poor households would be reclassified as 
near-poor or poor without their receipt of DC income. The 
very low rate of DC income receipt relative to DB and Social 
Security income receipt among older households (see Table 
3) certainly contributes to these modest estimated impacts. 
However, the low rate of DC income receipt is unlikely to fully 
account for its modest impact. Although nearly twice as many 
older households received Social Security income than DB 
income in 2006 (76 percent vs 39 percent), 1.2 million more 
households are estimated to escape poverty or near-poverty 
status due to DB income receipt than to Social Security 
income receipt. However, it is notable that Social Security 
income receipt appears to protect more older households than 
does DB pension receipt from more extreme poverty defined 
solely by the FPL (2.9 million vs 1.7 million). In other words, 
Social Security is highly effective at helping seniors avoid 
poverty, but DB pensions enable people to maintain a middle-
class standard of living in retirement.
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Table 8 contains estimates of the impacts of DB, DC, and 
Social Security income receipt on the material hardships 
experienced by older American households. We estimate that 
more than a half-million additional older households would 
have experienced food hardships in 2006 if it were not for 
their DB pension income. While this impact may appear to be 
modest, it would reflect nearly a 23 percent increase in older 
households experiencing food hardships, and it is considerably 
larger than the estimated impacts of DC income receipt. 
Interestingly, Social Security income receipt was not associated 
with the risk of food hardships when other factors affecting 
the risk of food hardships were statistically accounted for.34 
Without their DB pension income, we estimate that about 
380,000 additional older households would have experienced 
a shelter hardship in 2006, a 26 percent increase over the 
actual estimated 1.45 million older households with shelter 
hardships that year. The estimated impacts of both DC income 
and Social Security income were far more modest, ranging 
between 30-40,000 additional households experiencing 
shelter hardships. We also estimate that additional 320,000 
additional households with a head age 60 or older would 
have experienced a health care hardship in 2006 without their 
receipt of DB pension income, a 16.5 percent increase over the 
actual national estimate of 1.9 million older households for 
that year. Similar to what was found for food hardships, Social 
Security income receipt was not associated with health care 
hardships, and estimated impacts of DC income receipt were 
far more modest than those of DB pension receipt. 
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Lastly, Table 8 also contains national estimates of the impact 
of DB, DC, and Social Security income receipt upon older 
households’ receipt of means-tested public assistance. We 
estimate that without their receipt of DB pension income, an 
additional 1.4 million older American households would be 
added to the rolls of public assistance recipients in 2006. This 
represents nearly a 40 percent increase over the 3.4 million 
older households receiving public assistance in 2006. While 
a very modest impact was found for DC income receipt, the 
greatest estimated impacts were associated with Social Security 
income receipt. We project that an additional 1.9 million older 
households would place demands on public assistance benefits 
if not for their receipt of Social Security income. Employing the 
mean dollar amount of $5,373 received by all older households 
with public assistance in 2006, we estimate that DB pension 
income and Social Security income receipt reduced claims 
on governmental public assistance from older households in 
2006 by about $7.3 billion dollars and $10.1 billion dollars, 
respectively. These impacts are large, particularly when it is 
considered that Medicaid expenditures are not included as 
public assistance in the SIPP data. While our estimates of 
savings associated with DB pension income are modest in 
comparison to aggregate total national expenditures by federal, 
state, and local governments, they represent about 8.5 percent 
of aggregate public assistance dollars received by all American 
households in 2006 for the same benefit programs.35 
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This study provides an empirical analysis of the contribution of DB pensions to 
the economic security of older American households. Our findings suggest that 
DB pension income plays a vital role in reducing the risk of poverty and material 
hardships among older households. 
In 2006 rates of poverty among older households without DB 
pension income were approximately six times greater than 
the rate among older households with DB pension income. 
Older households with DB pension income were also less 
likely to experience food, shelter, and health care hardships. In 
addition, DB pension recipient households were less reliant on 
means-tested cash and noncash public assistance. While DB 
pension recipient households fared better than households 
without pension income generally, DB pensions appear to 
have particularly improved the welfare of more vulnerable 
subpopulations of elder households. Our analysis indicates 
that common gender and racial disparities in rates of poverty, 
material hardships, and dependence on public assistance are 
greatly diminished, and in some cases nearly eliminated, 
among households receiving DB pension income. 
Quantification of some of the economic welfare benefits associ-
ated with DB pensions brings some tangible data supporting the 
premise that DB pensions enhance the chances that older Ameri-
cans can be self-sufficient after retirement from the workforce. 
Our analyses suggest that DB pension income has helped sub-
stantial numbers of older American households to avoid mate-
rial hardships associated with inadequate food, shelter, and health 
care. More specifically, we estimate that in 2006, DB pension re-
ceipt among older American households was associated with:
1.72 million fewer poor households and 2.97 million fewer v 
near-poor households
560,000 fewer households experiencing a food hardshipv 
380,000 fewer households experiencing a shelter hardshipv 
320,000 fewer households experiencing a health care hardshipv 
1.35 million fewer households receiving means-tested public v 
assistance
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Furthermore, not counting Medicaid reimbursements for acute 
and long-term medical care, we estimate that in 2006 there was 
about a $7.3 billion savings in public assistance expenditure 
associated with DB pension receipt. This represents about 8.5 
percent of aggregate public assistance dollars received by all 
American households in 2006 for the same benefit programs. 
This amount is significant, particularly given the pressures on 
safety net programs during the current fiscal crises experienced 
at all levels of government throughout the country.
While our empirical findings suggest that the impacts of DB 
pension income on the economic security of older American 
households are sizeable, they may only scratch the surface in 
measuring the full magnitude of social welfare benefits. It is 
well known that health and economic welfare are integrally 
related, particularly among the elderly. The reduced risks of 
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poverty, food, shelter, and health care hardships among elder 
households stemming from the greater economic security 
associated with DB pension should also produce favorable 
impacts on the health of older Americans. Having a healthy diet 
with regular meals, ample heat in one’s home in cold weather, 
and sufficient resources to seek medical care when needed 
should help older persons to better maintain their health and 
functional status as they advance in age. This should generate 
additional societal benefits from reduced demands on acute 
and long-term care resources over the long run. Although it 
was beyond the scope of this study to examine such secondary 
impacts of DB pensions, our study findings nevertheless 
underscore the vital role that both DB pension and Social 
Security income play in securing the economic welfare of older 
American households.
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For each of the 1996, 2001, and 2004 SIPP panel files, the information needed to conduct the descriptive and multivariate 
analyses was contained in a Core Wave data file and two topical modules. The Retirement and Pension Plan Coverage Topical 
Module (Topical module 7 in all panels) served as main file for construction of the analytic research file for each SIPP panel. The 
Core file for Wave 7 containing the same reference month as Topical module 7 was selected and merged to the Pension topical 
module. Since the topical module and core data files had the same reference month, all cases were matched in the file merger. The 
material hardship variables were contained in the SIPP Adult Well-Being Topical Module. These data were contained in Topical 
Module 8 in the 1996 and 2001 SIPP panels and in Topical Module 5 of the 2004 SIPP panel. Since the reference month of the 
Topical module differed from that of Topical module 7, a complete one-to-one match of respondents cannot be attained because 
of changes in the sample due to attrition and the addition of new household members over time in SIPP panel data. The final 
analysis file for each SIPP panel consisted of the subset of respondents with records in both the Pension and Adult Well-Being 
Topical modules. The population weights from the Pension Topical module of respondents in the final analytic file were adjusted 
upward to compensate for the sample attrition resulting from merger of the Adult Well-Being Topical Module.  
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In the descriptive analyses persons include all respondents age 60 years or older and households include all respondents who are a head 
of household. Person attributes, such as age, gender, and race associated with households are those of the head of the household. 
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Receipt of a defined benefit (DB) pension is defined here as receiving pension income from a former employer in the reference 
month associated with retirement, disability, or survivorship, and lasting for the remainder of one’s life. Similar to past research 
using SIPP data (Copeland, 2007), payments from Social Security, withdrawals from IRA, Keogh and 401K plans, and lump sum 
pension distributions are not counted as DB pension income. Pension receipt for persons is measured in two ways: (1) pension 
income received from one’s own former employer only, and (2) pension income received from both one’s own former employer 
and/or from the former employer of a current or decedent spouse. While public and private source of DB pension income cannot 
be distinguished in the SIPP Retirement and Pension Plan Coverage Topical Module, pension income sources are reported in 
SIPP Core Interview Waves. Accordingly pension receipt and amounts were determined using information from both the topical 
module and core wave data files corresponding to the same reference month. Pension income receipt and amounts from the 
former employer of a spouse/partner were determined in two steps. Since persons age 60 or older may have spouses younger than 
60 years old, a separate file containing pension income variables pertaining to one’s own former employer, was first created for all 
SIPP respondents at least 20 years old. The spouse person identifier variable contained from the SIPP core file was then used to 
merge spousal records with pension variables to all SIPP respondents 60 years old or older. Pension receipt for households includes 
pension income received from both the head of household’s own former employer and/or from the former employer of a spouse. 
Annual pension income was estimated by inflating amounts reported for the reference month by a factor of 12. Annualized 
pension income amounts were then inflated or deflated to constant dollars for January 2003 using the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) of the reference month and year (ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt).
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SIPP Core Interview data distinguish among seven types of DB pension income. Public pensions include: (1) Federal Civil 
Service or other Federal civilian employee pension, (2) U.S. military retirement, (3) state government, (4) local government, and 
(5) Railroad Retirement Board. Private pensions include: (1) company or union pension, and (2) other nongovernment retirement 
pensions. 
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Annual household income was estimated by inflating the amount reported for the reference month by a factor of 12. Household 
income quintiles pertain to households with heads of any age as reported in Historical Income Tables-Households, U.S. Bureau of 
the Census (http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/h01ar.html), for the calendar year corresponding to the SIPP 
data reference month and year. The quintile definitions for 1998 are: (below $16,116) ($16,116-$30,408) ($30,408-$48,337) 
($48,337-$75,000) ($75,000 and above). The quintile definitions for 2003 are: (below $17,984) ($17,984-$34,000) ($34,000-
$54,453) ($54,453-$86,867) ($86,867 and above). The quintile definitions for 2006 are: (below $20,035) ($20,035-$37,774) 
($37,774-$60,000) ($60,000-$97,032) ($97,032 and above).
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The SIPP contains a household-level variable containing the dollar amount for the U.S. Bureau of the Census poverty threshold 
or FPL associated with the respondent household. This threshold is based on household size, age of the head of household (65 
years and older versus under 65 years), and number of related children under 18 years old. This was variable was used classify into 
one of three poverty level classes: (1) poor at or below the FPL , (2) near poor above the FPL but at or below 200% of the FPL, 
and (3) not poor more than 200% of the FPL. 
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We constructed three material hardship measures from SIPP Adult Well-Being Topical Modules similar to the most frequently 
used material hardship measures in previous research. These include hardships related to: inability to meet basic living expenses, 
inadequate food consumption, and unmet medical or dental needs. A household is classified as having a shelter hardship if it 
reported that it experienced at least one of the following five hardships in the previous year: (1) did not pay the full amount of 
the rent or mortgage, (2) was evicted from one’s home or apartment for not paying the rent or mortgage, (3) did not pay the 
full amount of the gas, oil, or electricity bills, (4) gas or electric company turned off service, or the oil company did not deliver 
oil because of payment problems, and (5) the telephone company disconnected service because payments were not made. Food 
hardships were based on the three-point food security scale of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (She & Livermore, 2007). The 
scale is based on a count of responses of yes, sometimes, or often to five questions about food-related hardships experienced over 
the last four months because there was not enough money: (1) food we bought didn’t last, (2) couldn’t afford balanced meals, 
(3) cut size or skipped meals, (4) ate less than felt needed, and (5) didn’t eat for a whole day. A household is classified as “food 
insecure with hunger” with a count of 4-5 positive responses, “food insecure without hunger” with 2-3 positive responses, and 
“food secure” with one or no positive responses. The two food insecurity categories were combined into a single category in our 
dichotomous measure of food hardships. A household is classified as having a health care hardship if it reported that in the previous 
year a household member needed to see a doctor or dentist but did not go. 
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The SIPP contains information about various types of cash and noncash forms of public assistance received by households, as well 
as the aggregated amount of cash and noncash assistance received. A binary variable indicating the receipt of cash and/or noncash 
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public assistance receipt was created from two constructed SIPP variables: THTRNINC, an aggregated total of household means-
tested cash transfers for reference month, and THNONCSH, an aggregated total dollar value of noncash public assistance for the 
reference month. Means-tested cash assistance includes Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF) and general assistance. Noncash public assistance includes Women, Infants, and Children Nutrition Program 
(WIC), food stamps, and energy assistance. While the SIPP contains information about Medicaid eligibility, it is not counted 
here as public assistance because the SIPP does not have information on dollar amounts of Medicaid reimbursements. The annual 
dollar amount of public assistance received was computed as the sum of cash and noncash public assistance in the reference month 
inflated by a factor of 12. Annualized pension income amounts were then inflated or deflated to constant dollars for January 2003 
with the CPI of the reference month and year. 
Given the relatively low prevalence rate of households receiving public assistance, the sample sizes for some household subgroups 
in Table 6 are too small to produce reliable estimates of public assistance dollar amounts. More specifically, amounts of public 
assistance are not reported when either: the sample size for each subgroups was less than 100 respondent households, or when the 
sample size of one subgroup was less than 30, regardless of the sample size for the other subgroup(s). 
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The 2004 SIPP panel data were employed in the multivariate analysis. We report the results on models estimated on a sample of 
10,259 households with a head age 60 years and older. 
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Models were specified for four binary and one categorical dependent variable:
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Logistic regression models were first estimated for the four binary dependent variables defined above. A multinomial logit 
model was used to estimate the model with the categorical dependent variable of poverty status because the proportional odds 
assumption underlying an ordinal logit model specification were not supported by statistical tests. Observations were weighted 
by normalized population weights and the standard errors of coefficients were adjusted for the complex survey design of the SIPP 
by use of the svylogit procedure in Stata V10.0.
The key independent variables of interest in all of the models are the receipt of DB pension income, defined contribution (DC) 
contribution income, and Social Security (SS) income. These variables specified as dummy variables indicating the receipt of such 
income by the head of household and/or spouse. Based on availability in the SIPP data, additional variables were specified to 
account for other socio-demographic factors that should affect the poverty status, public assistance receipt, and material hardships 
among older households. These variables are defined in Table A.1. Several variables were only available for household heads 
that reported to have retired from a job or business in the past. These variables were only specified in the models used as part of 
sensitivity analyses of the empirical results obtained from the models estimated on the full sample of 10,259 older households.
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Since the statistical models are used to estimate the effects of DB, DC, and SS income receipt on adverse outcomes the models 
should be fully-specified as possible so that effects of other variables are not erroneously attributed to DB, DC, or SS income 
receipt. Unfortunately the SIPP does not contain information on lifetime earnings and wealth of households. However, the SIPP 
has some information about work history for individuals who retired from a job or business in the past that were not available for 
specification of covariates in the models estimated on the full sample of older households. These variables were: pre-retirement 
annual household income, years worked at pre-retirement job, and years since retirement. The models were re-estimated on the 
subsample of 5,086 households with a head age 60 years and older who reported that they had retired from a job or business. This 
allowed us to compare the results of models estimated with and without a richer set of factors affecting poverty status, material 
hardships, and public assistance for the subsample of ever-retired households. The most notable differences between the estimates 
for the subsample when the pre-retirement job variables were added were the education dummy variables and only a very modest 
improvement in model fit. The changes suggested that the effects of pre-retirement work variables on adverse welfare outcome 
variables were largely captured by the specification of education variables.  
Concerns may also be raised about the potential endogeneity problems in the specification of dummy variables for DB, DC, and SS 
income receipt since persons may self-select employment in jobs with DB pension or DC plans. We attempted to address this concern 
by re-estimating the models with a two-step probit model instrumental variable estimation procedure (ivprobit) where a model of 
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DB pension receipt is estimated first, and then predicted values from this model are used as instruments replacing the observed DB 
pension variables in the second-step model of public assistance or hardship outcome. While some caution should always be exercised 
in making predictions from estimated models, these models did not suggest that selection bias to be a serious problem.
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After estimating the coefficients for the models described above, we derived estimates of the additional older households that 
would have experienced the various adverse welfare outcome if it were not for their receipt of DB pension, DC income, and SS 
income. The estimation approach is described below for receipt of DB pension income and public assistance receipt. The same 
approach was used for other adverse welfare outcomes, and for estimating the impacts of DC and SS income receipt
Predicted values were obtained from the estimated model with actual values for DB pension receipt. These predicted values 1. 
were multiplied by SIPP population weights and summed to obtain a national estimate of the number of households with 
DB pensions receiving public assistance. 
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A second set of predicted values were then obtained. For these predictions, the DB pension receipt variable was set to zero for 2. 
all households with DB pensions rather than their actual value of one. These predicted values were then multiplied by SIPP 
population weights and summed to obtain a national estimate of the number of households that would be expected to receive 
public assistance if no households had DB pension income.
Since DB pension receipt was negatively associated with public assistance receipt, the difference between these two predicted 3. 
values is the national estimate of the additional number of households that would be expected to receive public assistance in 
the absence of DB pension income receipt.
The dollar impact of DB pension receipt of public assistance expenditures was obtained by multiplying the estimate of households 
from step 3 by the mean annual amount of public assistance received by older households in 2006 from the study data, or $5,373.

CPQ[T0#);^VXbcXRATVaTbbX^]ATbd[cb
?dQ[XR0bbXbcP]RT BWT[cTa7PaSbWX_ 5^^S7PaSbWX_ <TSXRP[2PaT7PaSbWX_
EPaXPQ[Tb >SSbAPcX^ _eP[dT
>SSb
APcX^ _eP[dT
>SSb
APcX^ _eP[dT
>SSb
APcX^ _eP[dT
31_T]bX^]aTRTX_c !&  #%  $  %' "
32X]R^\TaTRTX_c #  "!  $ "%  "& 
BBX]R^\TaTRTX_c ##  (% &((   ((&   ( !$!
2daaT]cW^dabf^aZTS
_TafTTZ (#  (( # (&  (( #
0VT (&  ("  (%  (# 
1^a]^dcbXST^UDB !#  %# "#   ( ""' '( $#
'^aUTfTahTPab^U
bRW^^[R^\_[TcTS $(%  #'&  "%  "'' 
(  hTPab^UbRW^^[ #$%  "$"  "!$  !( 
7XVWbRW^^[VaPSdPcT^a643 !#&  !(  ! !  !  
 "hTPab^UR^[[TVT  (  " "  !"  !# 
<P[T (( (" &# ! '  ! && !
FXS^fTS  #%   #% (   '  &&  #!   
3Xe^aRTS^abT_PaPcTS !"  ! (  !#"   (( 
=TeTa\PaaXTS    %& (( (&" (# '! '( %('
=^]7Xb_P]XR1[PRZ "&  "("  " "   ## %
7Xb_P]XR !#!   (% #  ((  '& $!&
>cWTaAPRT  (!   (!   !!    & #("
7^dbTW^[S\T\QTab  $%    "  !  $ " (   &  
<XSfTbc &! ( &$  !" '% "!" (' ("
B^dcW '! && % ! &"  '  # &&"
FTbc &' %' %' %" &(  '"  ( $$$
<Tca^_^[XcP]PaTP
aTbXST]RT  % #(( ( !## (( ''"  & "&"
?bTdS^Ab`dPaT !$  #  ! &
!'=PcX^]P[8]bcXcdcT^]ATcXaT\T]cBTRdaXch
CWXb_PVTX]cT]cX^]P[[h[TUcQ[P]Z
CWT=PcX^]P[8]bcXcdcT^]ATcXaT\T]cBTRdaXchXbP]^]_a^ËcaTbTPaRWX]bcXcdcTTbcPQ
[XbWTSc^R^]caXQdcTc^X]U^a\TS_^[XRh\PZX]VQhU^bcTaX]VPSTT_d]STabcP]SX]V^UcWT
eP[dT^UaTcXaT\T]cbTRdaXchc^T\_[^hTTbT\_[^hTabP]ScWTTR^]^\hPbPfW^[T=8AB
f^aZbc^Ud[Ë[[cWXb\XbbX^]cWa^dVWaTbTPaRWTSdRPcX^]P]S^dcaTPRW_a^VaP\bcWPcPaT
]PcX^]P[X]bR^_T
C^R^]bTaeTË]P]RXP[P]ST]eXa^]\T]cP[aTb^daRTbcWXb_aX]cTSTSXcX^]XbPQaXSVTS
C^eXTfcWTaT_^acfXcWXcbcTRW]XRP[P__T]SXg_[TPbTeXbXcfff]Xab^][X]T^aV.
 &"A7>348B;0=30E4=D4=FBD8C4!&F0B78=6C>=32!"%
CT[)!!#$&' (5Pg)!!#$&' ( fff]Xab^][X]T^aV
